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Summary  findings
Hernandez  and Katada analyze the effects of bilateral  (such as poverty levels, indebtedness, and access to
debt forgiveness (part of official development assistanice)  alternative sources of finance).
on 32 low-income countries in Africa (1984-9)3). Asking  Bilateral OD)A  debt forgiveness appears to be neutral
whether it makes a difference for recipient countries To  in the sense of not having any significant impact on
receive pure grants rather than official development  recipienr countries'  capacity to import. Bilateral ODA
assistance (ODA) debt relief, they focus on how one form  debt forgiveness has neither increased or curtailed the
of aid or the other affects the countries' nimport capacity.  imp(ort  capacity of the major recipient countries. During
They conclude that:  1  989-93,  multilateral lending replaced the decrease in
Grants allowed recipient countries to siginificanitly  bilateral lending that, in turn, was caused by an increase
expand their import capacity for 1984-93  as graints and  in grants. (Bilateral ODA debt relief implies smaller cash
import capacity have been increasing since 1984. But the  flows because it is "pseudo"  or "accounting" money and
increasing share of concessional lending and dcebt  relief  because with it goes reduced new lending from bilateral
in recent years has not allowed these countries to reduce  sotirces.)
their total indebtedness and solve their debt overhan;g  Private creditors have typically withdrawn money
problem. Their arrears increased significantly.  from the countries in the sample as grants increased. And
* The biggest recipients of debt relief also received the  debt relief has hald a crowding-out effect on new lending.
lion's share of the increase in pure grants. Debt  Bilateral donors  are switching their development finance
forgiveness and pure grants were allocatcd in a way not  to Africa from concessional and nonconcessional lending
entirely consistent with standard econormic  hicrarchies  to)  a combination of pure grants and ODA debt relief.
This paper - a product of the International  Finance Divisioin,  International  Economics Department - is part of a larger
effort in the department to monitor developmncnts  in highly  indebted low income countries. Copies of the paper are available
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The lack of private financial flows to Sub-Saharan Africa in recent years has made
countries in the region increasingly dependent on official development assistance (ODA),
in the form of either grants or highly concessional lending. Meanwhile, "aid fatigue" has
become a common concern among many in the field of development, and aid flows have
fallen in recent years as budget constraints in the major donor countries become
increasingly tight.
Given the increasing demand from developing countries for additional aid flows
on the one hand and the limited resources available from industrial countries on the other,
aid effectiveness is a critical issue. In this context official donors have stepped up their
efforts to provide larger amounts of aid (with partial or no repayment obligation) and to
provide official debt forgiveness, bilaterally and through the Paris Club.
This paper evaluates the effect these initiatives had on recipient countries based
on data accumulated during 1989-93. The analysis focuses on the potential tradeoff
between pure grants and bilateral ODA debt forgiveness, in thirty-two poor African
countries.
The analysis first compares countries that have received significant amounts of
ODA debt forgiveness in recent years with those that have not, and then compares the
two groups of countries during 1984-88 and 1989-93 (ODA debt forgiveness surged
during the latter period).  The effect of the two types of aid is measured by the recipient
countries'  import capacity.
There are five major conclusions of the paper:
Grants have allowed recipient countries to significantly expand their import capacity
over the past decade (1984-93). In fact, grants and import capacity-inclusive  of
international reserves accumulation-have  been increasing since 1984. Yet the
increasing share of concessional lending and debt relief in recent years has not
allowed these countries to reduce their total indebtedness and solve their debt-
overhang problem.  In fact, arrears increased significantly during this period for all
the countries in our sample.
*  The 32 countries in the sample can be grouped according to the type of ODA debt
relief they have received from donors.  Of the three groups, the highest recipients
have received the lion's  share of debt forgiveness and the largest increase in pure
grants. The paper investigates the rationale for such a distributional pattern and finds
that standard economic hierarchies (such as per capita income, foreign exchange
income, indebtedness, and access to altemative financial resources) do not
satisfactorily explain the allocation of debt forgiveness.*  The analysis, both in terms of means and incremental (marginal) effects, shows that
total grants (debt relief plus pure grants) have enabled all 32 recipient countries to
expand their import capacity. But, the analysis also shows that bilateral ODA debt
forgiveness alone has not allowed countries to increase their import capacity. Indeed,
the expansion in import capacity varies across country groups, and countries receiving
less debt relief have been able to expand their import bills by substantially more than
countries receiving the bulk of it. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that
debt relief does not free resources for imports, mainly because the written-off debt
was not being serviced by the debtor countries to start with.
*  Although bilateral ODA debt forgiveness has not directly increased the import
capacity of the major recipient countries, it has also not lowered it, something to be
expected if debt relief replaces other sources of finance for the recipient country. The
import capacity of countries receiving the bulk of the bilateral debt forgiveness has
not been curtailed, mainly because other forms of external financing-such  as net
transfers (new lending) from multilateral lenders and pure grants from bilateral
donors-have  increased along with debt relief.
*  Finally, when analyzing the relationship between grants and ODA debt relief and
other net financial flows (transfers), we find that, private creditors have usually
withdrawn money from the countries in our sample as grants increased. Moreover, the
paper finds a crowding-out effect between ODA debt relief and new lending from
bilateral sources, which illustrates that bilateral donors are switching their
development finance to Africa from concessional/nonconcessional lending to the
combination of pure grants and ODA debt relief.
In sum, there has been a significant effort by bilateral and multilateral creditors to
increase the external financial resources for low-income African countries, and such
efforts have had positive effects on the recipient countries in terms of expanding their
import capacity. But, debt relief on its own has been neutral in this regard. Furthermore,
during 1989-93 multilateral lending replaced the decrease in bilateral lending that, in turn,
was caused by an increase in grants.
..Introduction
Although recent economic policy reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa have enabled
countries in the region to restore economic growth, the region's  lack of human and
physical capital, their increasing debt overhang,' and inability to attract financial flows
from private sources represent major obstacles to achieving sustainable economic growth
(Cohen, 1995).
The lack of private financial flows in recent years has made Sub-Saharan African
countries increasingly dependent on official development assistance (ODA), defined as
financial flows from donor countries in the form of either grants or highly concessioral
lending. Of the $132.7 billion in total external debt owed at the end of 1993 by the so-
called Special Program of Assistance (SPA) countries 69 percent was owed to official
creditors (bilateral and multilateral).2 Of that, 59 percent (41 percent of the total)
originated as financial flows extended on concessional terms.
At the same time "aid fatigue" has become a common concern among many in the
field of development in recent years. In fact ODA from OECD countries dropped by
almost $5 billion recently, from $60.9 billion in 1992 to $56.0 billion in 1993, and fell by
another 6 percent (in real terms) during 1994.4  The main cause of this drop is the
increasingly tight budget constraints of the major donor countries. For example, between
1992 and 1993 ODA from the United States fell from $11.3 billion to $9.7 billion, and
even Sweden (traditionally a strong aid supporter) cut its aid from $2.5 billion to $1.8
billion in the same period (OECD, 1995).
Given the increasing demand from poor developing countries for additional aid
flows on the one hand and the limited resources available from industrial countries on the
other, aid effectiveness has become a critical issue. In this context official donors in
recent years have stepped up their aid efforts in two ways: by providing more grants (with
no repayment obligation) and by providing official debt forgiveness, bilaterally and
through the Paris Club (World Bank, 1994c, 1995, 1996).
This paper evaluates these efforts based on limited data accumulated over 1989-
93. We provide a descriptive analysis of the impact on the recipient countries of the
different aid efforts and channels used in the recent past. Our analysis is limited in that
I Sub-Saharan Africa is the only region that saw debt indicators worsen during 1995 (World Bank, 1996).
2  The SPA is a forum that was formed in 1988 with the international donor community and under the chairmanship  of
the World Bank to coordinate external support for reform programs undertaken by low-income, debt-distressed
countries in Africa.  The objectives of the SPA are to ensure that adequate balance of payments finance is available
for reform programs and to provide a forum for improving the effectiveness and efficiency of donor assistance for
the program.  Currently, 32 African countries participate in these activities along with bilateral and multilateral
donors.
3  The share of debt owed to official creditors  increases from 69 to 72 percent when Nigeria is excluded from  the
sample, and the share of concessional debt rises from 59 to 71 percent (51 percent of the total).
ODA from OECD countries was equivalent to 0.29 percent of donors'  GNP in 1994, its lowest level since  1973
(World Bank, 1996). The ODA figures calculated by the OECD differ somewhat from those calculated by the World
Bank.  A major difference is that the OECD data include Technical Cooperation grants; World Bank data do not.
Iwe look at only one aspect of aid effectiveness, namely, the change in recipient countries'
capacity to import goods and services. Also, we concentrate on the potential trade off
existing between pure grants and bilateral ODA debt forgiveness,5 and we limit our
analysis to the SPA countries, mainly because of data availability.
The analysis is carried out, first, by comparing countries that in recent years have
received significant amounts of bilateral ODA debt forgiveness with those that have not
and, second, by comparing the same groups of countries during 1984-88 and 1989-93
(bilateral ODA debt forgiveness surged in the latter period). Using this approach we
address the allocation, use, and impact of grant flows; that is, we aim to provide answers
to questions such as: Are there anly  common features to countries that have received
increased ODA debt forgiveness (or pure grants) from bilateral donors?6 Does it make
any difference to provide pure grants or ODA debt forgiveness, from the recipient
countries' point of view?  Has there been a tradeoff between bilateral ODA debt relief
and pure grants? More generally, what lessons can be learned from the recent experience
in terms of the optimal mix (if any) of pure grants and bilateral ODA debt relief.?
The second section of the paper sets the stage by presenting the facts; that is, it
analyzes the allocation of grants and bilateral ODA debt forgiveness during 1984-93 to
the 32 countries in our sample. The main conclusion from this section is that grants and
ODA debt relief to African countries most likely have been allocated according to some
intricate economic hierarchy-but  one that is difficult to identify on an a priori basis]7  In
fact, the relative allocation of grants and ODA debt relief among the countries in the
sample consistently violates basic economic hierarchies such as level of absolute poverty,
access to other sources of finance, and indebtedness. Furthermore, African countries'
increasing arrears suggest that ODA debt relief most likely does not free foreign
exchange for alternative uses (such as paying for additional imports of goods and
services).
The third section examines how grants have supported countries' financial needs
and their relationships with other capital flows. The analysis is carried out using a mean
comparison and on an incremental basis (using correlations). The main conclusion here is
that the increase in bilateral ODA debt relief since 1989 has been neutral in the strict and
limited sense that it has not affected recipient countries' ability to import. However, this
neutrality has occurred mainly because additional funding (new lending) has been
provided by multilateral lenders that, in turn, has replaced the decreased lending from
bilateral sources (in recent years bilateral lenders have been partially shifting new loans to
grants and debt relief). The final section summarizes and concludes.
5 "Pure" grants are grants other than debt relief and the grant element embodied in concessional lending.  In addition,
our analysis focuses on the debt relief of bilateral concessional loans; we ignore the debt relief of nonconcessional
loans.  The mix of bilateral ODA debt forgiveness and pure grants seems to be relevant because ODA grant figures
consist of both components. and they may have a different impact on the recipient countries in terms of their
capacity to import from abroad.  Import capacity is defined later in the paper.
7  For simplicity, hereafter we will use 'ODA debt forgiveness' and 'bilateral ODA debt forgiveness' interchangably.
Alternatively,  the allocation of grants and ODA debt relief can be explained by political reasons. This and many
other criteria guiding the allocation of grants and debt relief are not explored in this paper.  --
2Grants and ODA Debt Forgiveness in Africa
Grants to Africa have increased significantly since 1989. In this paper we
distinguish between grant figures that include ODA debt forgiveness, which we call total
grants, and those without the forgiveness element, which we call pure grants.  This
distinction is made because these two types of grants may have a different impact on the
resource balance of recipient countries.
Recent trends
Total grants and pure grants to African countries have been increasing since the
late 1  980s, and especially during the early 1  990s. Mos of ODA debt forgiveness began in
1988 with very small amounts, increased in 1989, and peaked in 1990 at slightly more
than $2 billion.  Since 1991 it has been high and stable-between  $500 million and $1
billion a year (Chart 1).
Chart 1. ODA,  Grants,  and ODA  debt forgiveness  for 32 African  countries,  1984-93
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Source: OECD/DAC.
Note:  ODA comprises  grants  plus otlier forms  of assistance.  Grants,  in turn, comprise  debt  forgiveness
and  "pure" grants.
The 32 recipient countries in our sample differ in the size of their economy, their
indebtedness, and the types of capital flows they have received. Within this context we
analyze next how the mix of grants and ODA debt forgiveness is allocated across these
countries; that is, we study whether there is a clear criteria or rationale for such allocation.
3Allocation of grants and ODA debtforgiveness
Three groups of countries can be identified from the share or level of ODA debt
forgiveness included in total grants.  Countries in the first group-the  high group-
received more than 15 percent of total grants in the form of ODA debt forgiveness during
1989-93 (26 percent on average as a group). Countries in the second group-the  middle
group-received  5-15 percent of total grants in the form of ODA debt forgiveness during
the same period (  I percent on average as a group). Countries in the third group-low
group-received  less than 5 percent of total grants in the form of ODA debt forgiveness
during 1989-93 (3 percent on average as a group). In absolute terms the difference
between the three groups is striking: $403 million of debt forgiveness during 1989-93 for
the average country in the high group, $145 million for the average country in the middle
group; and just $24 million for the average country in the low group (Table 1).  8
Table 1. Average grants and ODA debt forgiveness for three groups of countries, 1984-88
and 1989-93
(millions  of U.S. dollars)
Total grants  ODA debt forgiveness  ODA debtforgiveness
Grants (percent)
Country  group  1984-88 average(*)  1989-93 average  (*) (1) 1989-93 average (*) (2) '89-93 average (2)1(1)
Low group (16 countries)  489  800  24  3%
Middle group (9 countries)  606  1,268  145  11%
High group (7 countries)  606  1,560  403  26%
iTotal  548  1  1098  141  13%
(*) Five year total  for each country  has been  taken,  then tfhe  simple  average  for each group  was  calculated  for the five  year
period.
Source: OECD/DAC
(i)  Poverty indicators and export earnings. Neither absolute poverty (in terms of
GNP per capita) nor lack of access to foreign exchange (through exports) seem to have
been a criteria in allocating ODA debt relief and pure grants in recent years.  In fact, the
countries in the low group, are the poorest among all three groups, indicating that poverty
did not serve as the basis for the allocation of grants or forgiveness (Table 2).9 In
addition, countries in the high group are also significantly better off in terms of their
capacity to generate foreign exchange through exports; that is, despite receiving more
grants than the low group, relative to exports the grants received by the high group are
about one-third that received by the low group. Therefore it can be argued that if one
criteria to allocate grants is the size of the export industry in the recipient country-
giving more grants and forgiveness to countries where foreign exchange is more scarce-
then grants seem to have been poorly allocated in recent years.
The countries in the high group are Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Zambia.  The
middle group is: Benin, Congo, Cote D'ivoire, Guinea, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania and Togo.  The
low group is: Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, the
Gambia,  Guinea-Bissau, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome, Uganda and Zimbabwe.
We also analyzed the allocation of grants and ODA debt forgiveness on per capita basis and found that poverty may
have guided some allocation decisions.  For details see Appendix 1.
4Table 2. GNP per capita and grants as a share of exports for three groups of countries,
1984-88 and 1989-93
GNP per capita  (USS)  Grants as a share of Export
earnings (percent)
Country  Group  1984-88  1989-93  1984-88  1989-93
average (*)  average (*)  average  (*)  average (*
Low group (16 countries)  277  320  66  126
Middle group (9 countries)  480  452  59  95
High group  (7 countries)  433  460  21  40
Total  371  390  54  98
(*) Simple  average. Average  number  for a country  has  been taken for each five  year period,  then simple
average  was  calculated  using  the average  of each country.
Source: OECD/DAC;  World  Bank, IMF.
(ii)  Access to other sources offinance.  From a different perspective; tGtal grants
represent a much larger share net long-term debt flows for the low group than they do for
the high group, meaning that countries in the high group have not only received larger aid
flows (grants) but also larger net debt flows (Table 3).  In other words lack of access to
other sources of finance (in particular, new lending) does not seem to have been a criteria
used to allocate grants and ODA debt relief in recent years.
However, more important is the fact that for the high group grants as a share of
net long-term debt flows tripled between 1984-88 and 1989-93, while this ratio suffered a
slight decline for the low group. The 200 percent increase in this ratio for the high group,
from 0.43 to 1.29, while grants increased by 157 percent, implies that net long-term debt
flows are decreasing in absolute tenns for this group of countries. Thus, if the dynamic
trend-the  drying up of other financial resources-has  been a rationale for the allocation
of grants and debt relief, it appears that the relative allocation between the high and low
groups has been well implemented. This criteria fails to explain the relative allocation of
grants and ODA debt relief between the high and middle groups, however. Indeed, the
last two columns of Table 3 show that the middle group is suffering more from such
drying up than the high group, yet the middle group received less grants and ODA debt
relief than the high group.
Table  3. Ratio  of grants  to net financial  flows and debt for three groups of countries
(percent)
Grants as share of total debt  Debt as a share of GDP  Grants as share of
net financial flows
Country group  1984-88  1989-93  1984-88  1989-93  1984-88  1989-93
average  (*)  average  (*)  average  (*)  average  (*)  average  (*)  average  (*)
Low group (16 countries)  13  12  84  117  213  204
Middle group (9) countries  4  6  133  161  46  205
High group (7) countries  4  7  109  135  43  129
Total  8  9  104  134  129  188
(*)  Simple  average. Average  number  for a country  has been  taken for each five  year period,  then simple  average  was  calculated  using the
average  of each country.
Source:  OECD/DAC, World Bank, IMF.
5(iii)  Indebtedness.  Relative indebtedness among the thirty-two countries in our
sample seems to be a criteria used for the allocation of ODA debt forgiveness. Indeed, the
ratio of debt to GDP is higher for the high and middle groups than for the low group (see
Table 3). In addition, countries in the low group have received grants covering 12 -13
percent of their debt stock (nominal); the same ratio for the high and middle groups has
been 4-7 percent.  Between the high and middle groups, however, the indebtedness
criteria fails to account for the allocation of grants and ODA debt relief. The middle
group has received less ODA debt forgiveness (and grants) than the high group even
though it is significantly more indebted.
In sum, the evidence seems to suggest that grants and ODA debt relief to African
countries have n=j  been allocated consistently and according to such basic hierarchies as
level of absolute poverty, access to other sources of finance, or indebtedness. Thus it
seems as if grants and ODA debt relief have been allocated according to some other
economic hierarchy that is more difficult to identify (such as a complex combination of
all of the above factors).'0
The impact of ODA debt relief on recipient countries' debt overhang
In recent years indebtedness increased for all three groups of countries.  Debt as
share of GDP increased by 33 percent for the low group, 28 percent for the middle group,
and 28 percent for the high group (see Table 3, two center columns).
In addition, there has been a rapid increase in arrears and in the ratio of interest
and principal arrears against total debt, particularly for the high and middle groups (Chart
2). While their nominal debt stock doubled between 1984 and 1993, their arrears
increased more than thirteen fold, causing the ratio of arrears to debt stock to increase
about six fold, on average. Here it is worth noting that since their debt stock includes a
high and increasing portion of concessional debt, the present value of their debt is
significantly smaller than the nominal value used in Chart 2. Thus one can argue that if
the present value of debt is used as the denominator in the ratios shown in Chart 2, that
will further increase the ratio of arrears to debt stock. The fact that there is such a large
amount of arrears regardless of the ODA debt forgiveness implies two conclusions:
*  First, despite the rigorous efforts by donor countries in recent years in increasing pure
grants and implementing ODA debt forgiveness, the debt servicing capacity of
African countries remains very low.
*  Second, it may be that the ODA debt that has been forgiven was not being serviced,
which indicates that such debt relief activities have not yet freed additional resources
for the recipient countries to spend on other uses. This conclusion is important for the
analysis in the next section.
'° Alternatively, the allocation of grants and ODA debt relief can be explained by political reasons; see also footnote 7.
6In sum, although both grants and ODA debt forgiveness to African countries have
increased since the late 1980s, the allocation of these funds is not well explained by basic
economic hierarchies such as relative poverty levels or foreign exchange scarcity. The
relative level of indebtedness of the recipient countries seems to partially drive the
allocation of ODA debt relief, but the large and increasing arrears for these highly
indebted countries suggests that the incoming funds are not sufficient to solve their debt
overhang problem. I  IFurthermore, it suggests that countries receiving relatively more
debt relief may not necessarily end up having more foreign exchange to spend on other
uses, such as financing a larger import bill. We discuss this subject in the next section.
Chart  2. Total arrears  as a share of total debt for the three  groups  of countries,  1984-93
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Effectsand  Beefits  f  ODA  dbtforivenes  for,  Afriaountie
This section assesses the effect ODA debt forgiveness has had on recipient
countries. To do so, we first propose a simple indicator to measure the benefits that
accrue to recipient countries when granted debt relief.  Then, using this indicator we
analyze, whether countries receiving more debt relief are better off than those receiving
less. The main conclusion here is that countries receiving more bilateral ODA debt relief
are neither better off nor worse off than those receiving less. Finally, we attempt to
explain these findings by exploring additional hypothesis, such as the presence of
compensatory flows. Appendix 2 provides the analytical framework used in this section.
The following main conclusions can be drawn from this section:
*  The increase in ODA debt relief since 1989 has been neutral, on average and on an
incremental basis, in the sense that it has not affected the import capacity of the major
recipient countries.
"On this issue see also World Bank. 1996. chapter 2.
7*  For countries that have received the bulk of the bilateral debt relief in recent years,
their capacity to import has not been curtailed because they have received additional
funding from multilateral and private sources and because they have not seen as much
of a decrease in lending from bilateral sources as the other country groups.
*  For countries that have received limited debt relief in recent years, bilateral sources
have been substituting grants for new lending, but this has been partially compensated
by obtaining additional lending from multilateral sources.
Measuring benefits accruing to recipient countries
In this exercise we use the countries' capacity to import in excess of their own
exports and to accumulate international reserves as indirect measures of the benefits that
accrue to them when receiving grants and debt relief. More specifically, we define the
import bill capacity of recipient countries as follows: trade account deficit plus the
difference between imports and exports of services, exclusive of all interest payments,
plus the increase in international reserves. This variable, which can be interpreted as the
capacity to finance a net transfer of resources from abroad, represents a country's
capacity to expand its consumption and investment possibilities beyond its own means.
Given the comparatively low levels of per capita income and consumption in Africa
(particularly among the countries in our sample), as well as their comparatively low
growth rates (Chart 3), it can be argued that an increase in either consumption or
investment (which leads to higher economic growth), or both, is clearly welfare
enhancing for this group of countries.
8Chart  3. Per capita consumption  and real GDP growth,  average  1984-93
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*  Consumption figures include only 28 countries; GDP growth figures include 30 countries.
**Growth rate ofthis  region is negative due to its economic transformation.
In measuring the benefits of ODA debt relief we include the change in
international reserves even though it is not directly linked to higher consumption and
investment. In other words we consider the accumulation of international reserves to be
one desirable use of foreign exchange (which needs to be financed) instead of it being a
source of funds to finance other needs-such  as imports of goods and services.  We
justify this approach by the low level of international reserves held by the countries
considered during the sample period (Table 4). In fact, developing countries tend to
maintain an average stock of foreign reserves in the range of 4-5 months of imports,
mainly as a buffer to protect them against short-term liquidity shocks. Assuming that the
average stock of foreign reserves held by other developing countries is near the optimum,
it appears that African countries need to increase their own holdings, to make themselves
less vulnerable to short-term liquidity shocks. Thus increasing African countries' stock
of foreign reserves is a desirable (welfare-enhancing) outcome.
The use of the import bill capacity as defined above as an indicator of the benefits
that accrue to the recipient countries when getting grants does not deny the existence of
several other potential (although less straightforward) benefits, such as the reduction in
indebtedness and its effects on creditworthiness, the strengthening of the fiscal stance (if
public debt is being written off) and its impact on inflation, and so on.4 3 Nevertheless,
12 In other words we put the change  in international reserves as an item "above the line," in contrast to the more
common classification of this entry as a residual in balance of payments accounting.
3 There are other issues involved in analysis of grants and debt relief that we ignore in this paper. For example, the
impact that different conditionality elements (imposed by donor countries) have on the recipient countries' medium-
and  long-term growth.  Also, there are potential benefits accruing to the different bodies in donor countries; for
9incorporating any of these additional potential benefits into the analysis not only would
require building up an appropriate analytical framework-something  that goes beyond
the scope of this paper-but  also appears to be of secondary importance given the
immediate needs facing these countries.
Table 4. International  Reserves  by Region:  Stocks  and Months  of Imports
Average  Average
African sample  1984-88  1989-93
Intemational Reserves/Monthly Imports  1.46  1.76
International reserves (US$ mill.)  4,638  6,810
Middle East
International Reserves/Monthly Imports  4.61  4.55
International reserves (US$ mill.)  52,643  59,187
Latin America
International Reserves/Monthly Imports  4.07  4.36
International reserves (US$ mill.)  47,351  78,422
East Asia
International Reserves/Monthly Imports  3.50  3.81
International reserves (US$ mill.)  45,153  96,723
All developing countries
International Reserves/Monthly Imports  4.93  3.77
International reserves (US$ mill.)  296,636  334,530
The data on the ratio of international  reserves  to months of imports  refer to all the countries  in the
sample.  However,  when excluding  Nigeria  these numbers  become 1.42  and 1.46 (instead  of 1.46 and
1.76),  which  makes  the point about  the lack  of international  reserves  even  stronger.
What is the impact of ODA debt  forgiveness?
This section assesses the impact of ODA debt relief on the recipient countries
using the import bill capacity indicator introduced above. We do this in two steps, first
using averages and second on a marginal basis.
Have countries receiving more ODA debt relief, on average, been able to import more?'4
Over the past decade African countries, as a whole and on average, have been able to
finance an increasing import bill, as defined above, in part because of an increasing trend
in grants.  In fact, import capacity and pure grants to the sample countries almost doubled
between 1984-88 and 1989-93 (measured in current U.S. dollars).  Still, pure grants were
insufficient to finance the transfer of resources from abroad, and the gap was covered by
new lending from both multilateral and bilateral sources (Chart 4).'5 Indeed, during 1984-
93 the share of financial needs import capacity covered by pure grants for all the sample
example, there is an improvement in the balance sheet of  lenders (typically export promotion agencies) in donor
countries.
14 The results reported have refer only to 31 countries. The smaller sample resulted from excluding Nigeria, which in
preliminary  estimates  and  analysis  appears  as  an  outlier.  This  pattem  repeated  systematically  throughout  the
analysis. Nigeria's  large oil reserves and its strong export performance may be causing such divergence. Several
examples of this are provided in footnotes.
IS For all data sources see appendix 3 below.
10countries  remained  fairly stable,  at around 83 percent,16  and official  sources  provided  a
stable flow of about $2.5 billion  a year  in new lending  (net transfers). Furthermore,  the
net transfer  from official  sources  also allowed  private  creditors  to withdraw  resources  at a
rate of about $0.6 billion a year  (panel  A in Table  5 last column).1 7
It is important  to note that, as suggested  earlier,  ODA debt forgiveness  does not
necessarily  free resources  to be used in importing  more, and that it could also lead  to
smaller imports  if substitution  between  ODA debt  relief  and other net flows  takes place.
Yet the evidence  shown  in Chart 4 indicates  that the latter  has not occurred.  Furthermore,
Table 5 shows  (panel  A) that for the sample  countries  as a group,  import  capacity
increased  by 75 percent  between 1984-88  and 1989-93,  an increase  slightly  smaller than
the one occurring  in pure grants  during  the same  period (77 percent),  and that in absolute
terms the increase  in import  capacity  was larger  than  the one occurring  in pure grants
($3.2 billion  and $2.6  billion, respectively).  Thus it can be argued  that the actual  transfer
of resources  from abroad  to African  countries  has not been  curtailed  as a result of an
increase  in the share  of bilateral  ODA debt  relief in total grants  to these countries.
Still, the comparison  across  groups  suggests  that, on average,  receiving  more
ODA  debt relief does not increase  a country's  capacity  to  finance a larger  import  bill. In
fact, the import  capacity  for the high group increased  by only 45 percent  between 1984-
88 and 1989-93  despite this group being  by far the largest  recipient  of ODA debt relief
and also the group in which  the largest  increase  in pure grants  occurred  (92 percent;  see
panel D in Table 5). Thus the low  and middle  groups  increased  their import  capacity  by
69 percent and 110  percent,  respectively,  despite  receiving  less  debt relief  and a smaller
increase  in pure grants  (67 percent  and 79 percent,  respectively;  see panels B and C in
Table 5). Note also that the high and middle  groups  received  almost  the same  amount  in
total grants during 1989-93,  about $2.2  billion  each per year. Yet, the high group
increased  its import  capacity  by much less than  the middle  group,  implying  again that an
increase  in debt  relief does not necessarily  enlarge  a country's consumption  and
investment. 1 S
16 When Nigeria is included in the sample the financial  needs of African  countries  drops from $5.9 billion to $2.-
billion a year, while  the ratio of pure grants  to import  bill capacity  increases  from 83 to 220 percent  (averaged  over
1984-93  but excluding  1985),  meaning  that pure  grants were more  than enough to finance  the import  bill of all the
sample  countries.
'7Again, when including  Nigeria  in the sample  the private  sector  appears  to be withdrawing  money at a higher  rate:
US$1.7  billion  per annum.
18Here  again Nigeria clearly contrasts  with the rest of the countries  in the middle  group.  Financial  needs import
capacity for the 9 middle countries  (including  Nigeria) during 1984-93 is negative and equal to $-4.7 billion;
however,  when  Nigeria  is excluded  from the sample  the middle  group  becomes  $1.7  billion  (see panel  C in table 5).
11Chart 4. ODA debt forgiveness and pure grants for 31 African countries
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At least two reasons can be advanced to explain this result concemning  the high
group:
*  ODA debt relief does not necessarily free resources to be used for additional imports,
especially if the debt being forgiven is not being serviced.
*  Debt relief does free resources, but these are partially compensated for by lower
inflows from other sources. In fact, Table 5 shows that on average net transfers from
multilateral sources increased between 1984-88 and 1989-93 for-all groups except the
high  group  (see  next  section).  Also,  total  transfers' 9 increased  by  about  30  percent
between 1984-88 and 1989-93, for the low group but by only 22 percent for the high
20 group.
One  additional  conclusion  from  Table  5 concerns  the  criteria  used  in allocating
ODA debt forgiveness among recipient countries. In particular, it could be argued that
debt forgiveness is allocated in a way that allows recipient countries to finance the gap
between their financial needs (import capacity) and the amount received as pure grants,
so that they do not need to incur additional borrowing to finance their import bills.
Nevertheless, the evidence shown in Table 5 does not support this hypothesis: the high
group is the only group in which pure grants are more than enough to finance the import
bill.
It is important  to note  that  the  fact  that  the  high  group  is less  constrained  than  the
other groups, in the limited sense of having pure grants covering a larger share of its
import  bill,  does  not  contradict  the  previous  finding  that  the  increase  in total  grants  did
,9  Total transfers comprise those froi  iultilateral,  bilateral, and private sources.
Note also that bilateral net transfers decreased during this period for all but the high group. it appears, then, that the
high group countries have been favored by bilateral sources in all respects: ODA debt forgiveness, pure grants, and
bilateral net transfers.
12not lead to a proportional increase in imports. Given the absolute level of poverty in
African countries and their immediate needs, it is expected ex ante that consumption,
investment, or even reserve accumulation expand along with the increase in total grants
(or even more given that the constraint is less binding). This will not be the case,
however, if the resources are being applied to other uses (such as repayment of debt).
Table 5. ODA debt forgiveness: Comparison across country groups
(in US$ millions)
Average  Average  Change  Average
1984-88  1989-93  (percent)  1984-93
(A) 31 SPA countries (excl. Nigeria)
Import bill  4,287  7,498  74.9%  5,892
ODA forgiveness  13  889  6819%  451
Pure grants  3,443  6,092  77.00/o  4,767
Pure grants/Import Bill (percent)  85.3%  81.6%  -4.3%  83.4%
Multilateral net flows  1,263  1,717  36.0%  1,490
Bilateral net flows  1,198  974  -18.7%  1,086
Total private net flows  -723  -501  -30.7%  -612
(B) Low group (16) countries
Import bill  2,369  3,993  68.6%  3,181
ODA forgiveness  3  77  28190/o  40
Pure grants  1,528  2,559  67.4%  2,043
Pure grants/Import Bill (percent)  65.3%  64.5%  -1.2%  64.9%
Multilateral net lows  595  945  58.7%  770
Bilateral net flows  416  306  -26.5%  361
Total private net flows  -164  -148  -9.4%  -156
(C) Middle group (8) countries (excl. Nigeria)
Importbill  1,103  2,318  110.2%  1,710
ODA forgiveness  7  248  3233%  128
Pure grants  1,070  1,914  79.0%  1,492
Pure grants/Import Bill (percent)  73.8%  (1)  84.9%  15.0%  80.7%  (2)
Multilateral net flows  228  381  67.6%  304
Bilateral net flows  493  294  -40.4%  394
Total private net flows  -360  -236  -34.6%  -298
(D) High group (7) countries
Import bill  816  1,186  45.5%  1,001
ODA forgiveness  3  564  20303%  283
Pure grants  845  1,619  91.6%  1,232
Pure grants/import Bill (percent)  114.8%  160.1%  39.5%  137.4%
Multilateral net flows  440  391  -11.2%  416
Bilateral net flows  288  374  29.9%  331
Total private net flows  -198  -117  -41.2%  -158
Notes:  (1) 1986-88;  (2) 1986-93.
In sum, the evidence presented above suggests that, the increase in ODA debt
relief since 1989 has been neutral in the strict and limited sense that it has not affected
recipient countries' ability to import (the high group has not outperformed the other
groups in terms of improvements in import capacity). Next we analyze the same problem
but from an incremental or marginal approach.
13What  has been the marginal  impact  on African  countries  of one additional  dollar in ODA
debt relief?  Table 6 reports the results of panel data regressions of import capacity  on
total grants (pure grants plus ODA debt relief), for the sample three groups of countries.
The results include a more restrictive model (A), that forces the relationship to be the
same for the entire sample period, and less restrictive ones (B and C) that allow for a
break-point in 1989, when ODA debt forgiveness began increasing. 21 It is important to
note that rather than implying any causality running from the independent variable
(grants) to the dependent variable (import capacity), as is the case in standard regression
analysis, our results are intended to be interpreted just as simple correlations between the
variables (for a methodological discussion see Appendix 2). Constants for all countries
are not reported because they are of no interest to our analysis. Similarly, results for the
less restrictive models are usually reported only when they differ from the results
obtained under the more restrictive one.
Table 6. Impact  of incremental  total grants  on import  bill capacity
(A)  (B)  (C)
Total  period  First period  Second  period
(1984-88)  (1989-93)
Low group  (16 countries)  1.285  stable  stable
(4.916)  **
Middle  group  (8 countries)  0.964  0.997  0.974
(5.913)  **  (4.296)  **  (5.626) *
High group  (7 countries)  0.364  0.523  0.400
(1.880) **  (1.117)  (1.819)  *
Nigeria  -15.087
(-1.456)  *
R 2 0.83  0.79
Adjusted  R 2 0.81  0.76
IF-test  40.67 ***  29.13***
Note:  t-statistics  are in parentheses.
*:  Significant  at I0 percent  on one-tail  test
**: Significant  at 5 percent  on one-tail  test
***: Marginal  significance  level of less  than I percent
Two main conclusions emerge from Table 6.22 First, the middle and the low
groups are not significantly different from each other from a statistical point of view.
That is, in both cases a $1 increase in total grants has been accompanied by a $1 increase
in import capacity (the results do not reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient is the
same for both groups). Furthermore, for both groups this result is stable over time; for the
low group the estimated coefficient is around 1.3 and significantly different from zero in
21  The results  of the unrestricted  models  reported  in the text refer  only to the 31 countries  that result from  excluding
Nigeria,  which again  in preliminary  estimates  and analysis  was  an outlier.
A third conclusion that emerges from Table 6 is that Nigeria is a clear outlier. This result,  which repeated
consistently  across  several  regressions,  is  illustrated  by the plot  of residuals  shown  in Appendix  4.
14both 1984-88 and 1989-93, while for the middle group the estimated coefficient is around
1.0 in both periods and also significantly different from zero.
Second, for the countries in the high group each $1 of additional grants has been
accompanied by $0.36 more imports (this result is significantly different from one in
absolute terms). 23 Although a smaller coefficient for this group could have been expected
ex-ante based on the fact that debt forgiveness does not necessarily free foreign exchange
and therefore may not lead to an improvement in a country's import capacity, the results
from the less restrictive model suggest that this weak relationship existed even before the
surge in debt forgiveness. Indeed, the relationship appears to be unstable over time:
during 1984-88 the point estimate is 0.5 but not significantly different from zero, while
during 1989-93 the estimated coefficient becomes 0.4 and significantly different from
both zero and one.
In sum, the results above confirm the previous findings that the increase in ODA
debt forgiveness since 1989 has not curtailed the high group's ability to import.
Furthermore, it could be argued that total grants have helped meet the financial needs of
recipient countries, particularly those in the low and middle groups and increasingly so
for those in the high group (for the high group grants have become more effectively used
in recent years in terms of meeting financial needs).
Additional hypothesis: Presence of compensatoryflows
Is there a crowding-out effect between total grants and other sources offinance?  The
previous results for the high group suggest that a crowding-out effect occurs between
total grants and other sources of funds, as mentioned earlier. This possibility is studied
next by looking at the correlation between total grants and different types of net transfers,
classified by source. Again, correlations were calculated for both a restricted and
unrestricted model, but we present and discuss the results for the unrestricted model only
when they differ significantly from the restricted model. All the relevant results are
presented in Table 7.
One major conclusion emerges from the analysis of Table 7: Over the past decade
and on an incremental basis, bilateral lenders have partially substituted total grants for
new lending for countries that have not received significant amounts of ODA debt
forgiveness.  However, this substitution has been offset by larger net debt flows from
multilateral sources (partially for the countries in the middle group and more than fully
for the countries in the low group).
This conclusion is supported by several findings.  First, there is a statistically
significant positive correlation between multilateral net transfers (new lending) and total
23 Note  that this  result is consistent with the one reported earlier;  that is that  the high  group has been the least
constrained in terms of scarcity of foreign exchange. Nevertheless, these results complement each other; that is, the
one in the previous section reters to annuial  averages over 1984-93, while the one discussed here refers to increments
over time.
15grants for both the low group and middle group (excluding Nigeria), which becomes even
stronger during 1989-93. For the low group this complementarity turned out to be $0.09
of new lending for each additional $1 in grants during 1984-88, and increased to $0.19
per $1 during 1989-93 (both results statistically different from zero and one).  For the
middle group this complementarity was negative (although not statistically different from
zero) during 1984-88 and $0.09 per $1 during 1989-93 (significant at 6.5 percent in a
one-tail test).
Table 7. Impact of incremental total grants on other financial transfers
(A)  (D)  (CU)
Total period  Period  Period
(1984-88)  (1989-93)
Low  group  (16 countries)  0.234  0.090  0.190
(3.652)  **(1.540)  *  (3.512)
Middle  group  (8 countries)  0.143  0.028  0.094
(2.516)  *  (-0.309)  (1.520)
High  group  (7 countries)  0.029  0.160  0.058
(0.779)  (1.068)  (1.350)
N igeria  -1.384
(-I1.733)  *  ..
R2  0.42  0.48
Adjusted  R2  0.35  0.41
F-test  5.86  7.03***
Low  group  (16 countries)  -0.151  -0.051  .- 0.120
(-2.560)  *  (-0.428)  (-1.754)  **
Middle  group  (8  countries)  -0.379  -0.410  -0.388
(-2.736)  **  (-1.858)  *  (-2.450)  *
High  group  (7 countries)  -0.040  -0.003  -0.032
(-0.833)  (-0.026)  (-0.588)
Nigeria  -5.000
(-2.121)  **
R 2  0.62  0.47  -
Adjusted  R 2  0.58  . 0.41
F-test  13.34  *  6.83***
Low  group  (16  countries)  0.056  0.112  0.073
(0.688)  (0.803)  (0.796)
Middle  group  (8 countries)  0.029  0.161  0.067
(0.324)  (0,888)  (0.587)
High  group  (7 countries)  0.042  0.174  0.071
(0.867)  (1.239)  (1.321)
Nigeria  -1.910
(-0.357)  ..  ..
R  0.58  0.52
Adjusted  R 2  0.530  0.46
F-test  11.32  ***  8.25***
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses.
*: Significant at 10 percent on one-tail test
**: Significant at 5 percent on one-tail test
***: Marginal significance level of less than I percent
16Second, there is a statistically significant negative correlation between bilateral
net transfers (new lending) and total grants for the low group and the middle group
(again, excluding Nigeria).  For the low group this substitutability was close to zero
during 1984-88 (-$0.05 per each additional $1 of grants, although not statistically
different from zero) and -$0.12 per $1 during 1989-93 (statistically different from both
zero and minus one).  For the middle group this substitutability is about -$0.4 per each
additional dollar in grants and constant over time.24
This result, based on an incremental analysis, is consistent with one shown in
Table 5 (although the latter is based on a mean comparison analysis); that is, the high
group appears to be favored by bilateral sources in several respects.  Indeed, a negative
correlation exists between total grants and new bilateral lending for all counties except
those in the high group. Furthermore, the high group also seems to be marginally favored
by private lenders; Table 7 reports that there is a marginal statistically significant positive
correlation (although unstable) between private net transfers and total grants for the high
group ($1 of additional grants was accompanied by an inflow of about $0. 17 from private
creditors during 1984-88 and $0.07 during 1989-93).
In sum, bilateral sources have been substituting grants for new lending for
countries that have not received the bulk of debt relief in recent years, but this has been
partially compensated by additional lending from multilateral sources. However, and
more relevant to our purposes, the capacity to import of countries that have received the
bulk of debt relief has not been curtailed because they have received additional funding
from multilateral and private sources and, at the same time, have not seen cuts in their
funding from bilateral sources.
Is there a crowding-out effect between ODA debt relief and other sources offinance?
One additional question concerns the substitutability between ODA debt relief and other
sources of finance. To study this possibility, which is most relevant for our purposes, we
proceed in two steps. First, we rerun some of the regressions reported above, replacing
total grants with pure grants as the independent variable and comparing the results.
Second, we estimate additional regressions using ODA debt forgiveness as the
independent variable.  The two-step approach provides a more comprehensive analysis
mainly because it allows the use of the whole sample when rerunning the first set of
regressions, which is not feasible when using ODA debt forgiveness as the independent
variable because it is equal to zero for most of the countries in the sample during 1984-
88.
24 The partial offsetting  between multilateral and bilateral debt flows, in the case of countries in the middle group,
implies that  official flows as a whole present a marginal statistically significant negative relationship  with total
grants, although the latter decreases over time.  That is, the correlation coefficient increased from about -$0.44 per
$1 during 1984-88 to about -$0.29 per $1 during 1989-93.
17As argued earlier, ODA debt forgiveness is not expected to improve a country's
import capacity when foreign debt is not being serviced, mainly because it represents
accounting or pseudo-money rather than actual money. Therefore it could be expected ex-
ante that the regression coefficients should turn to be larger in absolute value when using
pure grants than when using total grants.  Except in a few cases, this expectation was
valid.
Table 8 reports the results of regressing import capacity on pure grants for the
three country groups. We show only the regression for the entire sample period to
illustrate the effect on the coefficients of excluding ODA debt forgiveness from the
independent variable; we do not report results that were qualitatively the same as reported
in Tables 6 or 7.
Table 8.  Impact of incremental pure grants on import bill capacity
____________________________  - - Total period
Low group (16 countries)  1.333
(4.444)**
Middle group (8 countries)  1.215
(6.342)**





Adjusted R 2 0.82
F-test  41.13***
First period  Second period
._  _  _  ;=  ;:  ;;  ;  y  ;-E  ;  2 igg  -:  .;  (1984-88)  (1989-93)
High group (7 countries)  0.260  0.370
(0.431)  (1.019)
Note: t-statistics  are in parentheses.
*: Significant  at 10  percent  on one-tail  test
**: Significant  at 5 percent  on one-tail  test
***:  Marginal  significance  level  of less  than I percent
Nevertheless, the last row in Table 8 reports a very interesting result, namely, that
the correlation between the high group's import capacity and total grants is stronger than
the one between import capacity and pure grants (see Table 6).  Furthermore, the
correlation between import capacity and pure grants is not even statistically significant
(when using total grants it is statistically significant only during 1989-93, when ODA
debt forgiveness surged). As mentioned above, this result is counterintuitive because total
grants include pseudo-money, while pure grants most likely provide actual resources to
expand a country's  import bill.
18At least two alternative hypotheses can be advanced to explain this result. The
first is that, contrary to what was argued earlier, debt forgiveness does indeed free
resources from debt servicing that can be used to finance a larger import bill. However, a
regression of import capacity on ODA debt forgiveness for all the sample countries
during 1989-93 (excluding Nigeria) does not support this hypothesis. In fact, the ODA
debt relief variable turned out to be insignificant for all groups except the low group,  but
this result appears to be spurious in the sense that when adding pure grants to the same
regression ODA debt forgiveness becomes insignificant. (These regressions are reported
in Appendix 5.)
A different explanation can be found by looking at triangular relationships. In
particular, as suggested by some of the results above, it could be that on an incremental
basis, the high group gets additional funding from different sources along with the
increase in ODA debt forgiveness. This possibility is analyzed further in Tables 9 and 10.
Table 9. Impact  of incremental  pure  grants  on other financial  transfers  for the high group
First  period  Second  period
________-  ___  -- ___  ;___  -___ 1984-88  1989-93
Multilateral net transfers  0.066  0.014
(0.490)  (0.176)
Bilateral net transfers  0.129  0.045
_  (0.958)  (0.427)
Note: t-statistics  are in parentheses.
*: Significant  at 10 percent  on one-tail  test
**: Significant  at 5 percent  on one-tail  test
The results in Table 9, when compared with those in Table 7, show that for the
high group total grants are more significantly and positively correlated to multilateral net
lending than pure grants, especially during 1989-93 ($0.06 per $1 of additional grants,
with a marginal significance level-one-tail--of  9 percent; see Table 7, last column).
This result is consistent with the hypothesis posed above, that as the debt burden is
lessened by ODA debt forgiveness by bilateral donors, multilateral net flows tend to
increase (either through increases in disbursements or decreases in repayments).
19Table 10. Impact of ODA debt forgiveness on multilateral net transfers and bilateral net
transfers, 1989-93
Multilateral  Bilateral
net  transfers  net transfers
Low  group  (16 countries)  -0.708  -1.044
(-0.745)  (-1.737) **
High  group  (7 countries)  0.126  -0.105
(1.573) *  (-2.415)  **
Middle  group  (8 countries)  0.149  0.073
(0.577)  (0.397)
R2  0.56  0.73
Adjusted  R 2 0.44  0.65
F-test  4.62 *  1  9.71 ***
Note:  t-statistics  are  in parentheses.
*: Significant  at 10  percent  on one-tail  test
**:  Significant  at 5 percent  on one-tail  test
***:  Marginal  significance  level  of less  than  I percent
Finally, Table 10 shows that substitution between bilateral net flows and ODA
debt forgiveness occurred during 1989-93 for all the countries except those in the middle
group.  In particular,  for the low group  $1 of ODA  debt relief was matched  with  a
decrease of about $1 in new bilateral net transfers, although this drop was offset by an
increase in private net transfers of about the same amount (not reported in the table).
More important, for the high group this substitution has been only partial: $1 in ODA
debt relief has been accompanied by a decrease in bilateral net transfers of only $0.105,
and this drop was more than fully offset by an increase in multilateral net transfers of
$0.126. This offsetting result suggests the possibility that countries in the high group
have been able to finance a larger import bill in recent years, and on an incremental basis,
mainly because multilateral sources have made up for the decrease in new financing from
bilateral sources, which, in turn, are partially substituting debt relief for new lending.
In sum, the results above corroborate those presented earlier, that is, that countries
in the high group have not seen a worsening in their import capacity-despite  what they
receive is mostly ODA debt relief-mainly  because multilateral sources have replaced
bilateral sources in providing additional lending.
20Summary  and Conclusions
This paper analyzes the impact of bilateral ODA debt forgiveness on the recipient
countries and, in particular, whether it makes a difference relative to pure grants.  Our
approach is limited because it focuses on the effect each type of aid has on the import
capacity of countries and is limited to 32 very poor and highly indebted African
countries. Furthermore, the analysis ignores other forms of aid, such as the debt
forgiveness of official nonconcessional loans.
Rather than establishing a model to test for certain hypotheses, the paper keeps a
descriptive analysis. We chose a rather simple approach to analyzing this issue mainly
because ODA debt relief only became significant in the past five years, and also because
other, more complicated dimensions of the problem seem less important for the countries
analyzed here.
The criteria used to measure the benefits of total grants and pure grants is the
capacity to finance a larger import bill, defined as imports minus exports plus the increase
in foreign reserves. This seems a reasonable indicator to use, especially for the SPA
countries and Sub-Saharan Africa overall, since this group of countries has significantly
lower import capacity, consumption levels, and foreign exchange reserves than other
regions.
The five major conclusions of the paper:
- Total grants allowed African countries to expand their import capacity significantly
over 1984-93. In fact, grants and import capacity-inclusive  of international reserves
accumulation-have  both been increasing since 1984. Yet the significant efforts made
by donors-(in  the form of an increasing share of concessional lending in recent
years) have not allowed these countries to reduce their total indebtedness and solve
their debt overhang problem.  In fact, arrears have increased significantly during this
period for all the countries in the sample.
*  Among the 32 recipient countries studied here, three groups have received different
treatment from donors in terms of ODA debt forgiveness. The highest recipient
countries appear to be clearly favored in the sense that, they have also received the
largest percentage increase in pure grants. The paper attempts to investigate the
rationale for such a distributional pattern, but usual economic hierarchies such as
GNP per capita, foreign exchange income, indebtedness, and access to alternative
financial resources do not seem to explain the allocation of ODA debt forgiveness.
*  The analysis carried out in the paper, both in terms of means and incremental
(marginal) effects, shows that total grants have enabled all recipient countries to
expand their import capacity.  But ODA debt forgiveness on its own has not allowed
countries to improve their import capacity. Indeed, the expansion in import capacity
21varies across country groups: countries receiving less debt relief have been able to
expand their import bills by substantially more than countries receiving the bulk of it.
This result is consistent with the hypothesis that debt relief does not free resources to
be spent on a larger import bill, mainly because the written-off debt is not being
serviced.
*  Although ODA debt forgiveness has not contributed directly to increasing the import
bill capacity of the highest recipient countries, it also has not been a detriment to it,
something to be expected if debt relief replaces other sources of finance and reduces
the overall cash flow to the recipient country. The import capacity of countries
receiving the bulk of debt forgiveniess  has not been curtailed mainly because other
forms of external financing have increased along with debt relief, mainly net transfers
(new lending) from multilateral lenders and pure grants from bilateral donors.
*  Finally, in analyzing the relationship between grants and ODA debt relief and other
net financial flows (transfers), we find that private creditors have usually withdrawn
money from African countries as grants increased. Moreover, the paper finds a
crowding-out effect between ODA debt relief and new lending from bilateral sources.
In sum, the significant efforts by bilateral and multilateral creditors to increase the
external financial resources for African countries have helped the recipient countries
expand their import capacity.  But debt relief on its own has been neutral in this regard.
Furthermore,  during 1989-93 multilateral lending replaced the decrease in bilateral
lending which, in turn, was caused by an increase in grants.
This paper must be understood as a first and very simple attempt to measure the
benefits accruing to low-income countries when receiving grants and, in particular,
bilateral ODA debt relief.  The analysis is limited in several respects because it fails to
touch on many related issues that need to be explored, such as the long-term effects of
debt relief on country creditworthiness. This and other aspects of the problem should be
the subject of future research.
22Appendix 1: Per Capita Analysis on the Equalization Effect of Grants
No clear criteria for the allocation of grants and ODA debt forgiveness among the
32 African countries in our sample emerge from the analysis of these countries' economic
characteristics on a country by country basis.  The question here, then, is whether it
makes any difference if these countries are analyzed in per capita terms.
When grants are measured in per capita terms, the results are the opposite of the
one discussed in the text, which concludes that grants have been allocated to richer
countries.  In fact, the poorest countries have received, in per capita terms, about 67
percent or more pure grants than the richer countries.  Furthermore, this inequality
increased marginally from 67 percent to 68 percent between 1984-88 and 1989-93 (Table
A1.1).
This allocation of grants per capita implies that grants have come to compensate,
at least partially, for the initial inequality that exists in per capita GNP between the high
and low country groups.
Table Al.l  ODA  debt forgiveness
Total grants (incluing debt relief)  Pure grants (exluding  debt relief)
1984-S8  1989-93  1984-88  1989-93  1984-S8  19S9-93  19S44S  19L9-93
Average  GNP  per capita  Average  GDP  per capita  (const)  verage  GNP per  capita  Average  GDP per  capita  (const)
High  group  460  456  475  439  460  456  475  439
Lowgroup  277  320  311  305  277  320  311  305
Relative income
distribution  60.2%  70.2°/e  65.5%  69.5%  60.2%  70.2%  65.5%  69.5%
Toitl grants per cfapita  Totfal  grants per capita  Totul grants  per capita  Total grants per capita
1984-88  1989-93  1984-88  1989-93  1984-88  1959-93  1984-88  1959-93
High group  14.8  27  9  14.8  27.9  14.8  23.0  14.8  23.0
Low  group  24.7  39.4  24.7  39.4  24.7  38.6  24.7  38.6
(excl. STP  21.9  30.4  21.9  30.4
Relative  income
distribution  167.1%  141.1%  167.1%  141.1%  167.1%  168.1%  167.1%  163.1S%
GNP  +  grants per capita  GDP +  grants per catpita  GNP +  grant per caipita  GDP +  griants  per capita
1984-88  1989-93  1984-88  1989-93  1984-88  1989-93  198443  1989-93
High  group  475  484  490  467  475  479  490  462
Low group  302  359  336  344  302  359  336  344
Relative  income
distribution  63.5%  74.3%  68.5%  73.8%  63.5%  74.9%  68.5%  74.4%
Note:  High  group  has  received  significantly  more  ODA  forgiveness  than  low  group  STP  represents  Sac  Tome  Principe,  a small
country whose grants per capita ($185 for 1989-1993 average) is a clear outlier.
23Appendix 2: Methodological Issues
The approach chosen in this paper can be justified by means of the following
balance of payments identity:
(1)  Imp.  Gs&Ss + A' Int'l. Res  PGs + DR + AMT+ BNT+ PNT+ 4
import capacity  grants  official flows
where:
Imp.  Gs&Ss  = deficit  in  trade  balance  plus  imports  minus  exports  of  services
(exclusive of interest payments)
A+  Int'l. Res  = change in international reserves
PGs  = pure grants
DR  = ODA debt relief
MNT  = net transfers from multilateral official sources
BNT  = net transfers from bilateral official sources
PNT  = net transfers from private sources
= other sources or uses of funds (net), such as foreign direct investment
and short-term debt flows, plus errors and omissions
and where net transfers refer to disbursements minus repayments and minus interest
payments on debt flows. Also, MNT, BNT, and PNT refer to actual cash flows (as
opposed to accounting flows as is the case of DR).
It is clear from equation 1 that an increase in the debt relief component of grants
(DR) may be associated either with an increase in the capacity to import, with a decrease
in any of the other variables on the right hand side of the equation (such as PGs, or MA7),
or with a mix of both. In our analysis an increase in debt relief is considered welfare
enhancing only if import capacity increases along with it.25
25 The reader  may wonder  why, if equation  (1) is a cash-flow  equation  (and almost  an identity),  the DR variable  steps
in. Equation  (1) is presented  here for illustrative  purposes  only, that is, to provide  the conceptual  framework  that
underlies  the empirical  exercise.  In the empirical  exercise  we run only bivariate  regressions.
24Appendix 3: Data Sources
Data on reserves accumulation and on imports and exports of goods and services
(exclusive of interest payments) were obtained from the International Monetary Fund's
balance of payments database for all countries in the sample. Data on net transfers of
official and private flows were obtained from the World Bank's Debtor Reporting System
database, which reports actual cash flows. Data on ODA debt forgiveness and pure grants
was obtained from the OECD's Development Assistance Committee Creditor Reporting
System Database.  Because the ODA debt forgiveness data were collected recently and
are not yet fully consolidated, and some differences remain in the way donor countries
report debt forgiveness, the results reported in the paper should be interpreted with some
caution.
25Appendix 4: Residual Analysis for Nigeria
Nigeria takes part in the SPA program; however, it is a very different country with
much larger exports owing to its oil reserves.  Nigeria's average GDP ($35 billion during
1989-93) is more than three times the size of the next largest economy in the SPA group,
CMte  d'lvoire ($9.8 billion), and its exports account for about 36 percent of the 32 SPA
countries' total exports (1989-93).
Nigeria is also a clear outlier in terms of its capacity to extend its import bill
through total grants (in the whole series).  When total grants are regressed against import
bill capacity (R 2 of 0.8337), Nigeria is a strong anomaly.  Chart A4. 1 shows the residual
plot from the regression placing Nigeria at the very end of observations. It is clear from
this chart that Nigeria creates the most and the only major noise in this regression.  Thus,
in order to have more robust results, Nigerian observations were eliminated from the
sample when we reported the effect of grants on import bill capacity, as well as when we
ran grants (both total and pure) versus various dependent variables in two periods.
Chart  A4.1
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26Appendix 5: ODA Debt Forgiveness and Import Capacity
Table A5.1 shows the results of regressing import capacity, first on ODA debt
forgiveness for all the countries in the sample (excluding Nigeria) and second on both
ODA debt forgiveness and pure grants, during 1989-93. As expected, the results validate
the findings reported in the paper, that is, ODA debt relief neither allows countries to
import more nor curtails their capacity to do so.
Table A5.1 Impact  of ODA  debt relief (and pure grants)  on import  capacity,  1989-93
Regression  I  Regression  2
Country  group  Debt  relief  Debt  relief  Pure  grants
Low group  ( 16  countries)  5.462  3.02  1.11
(1.87)**  (0.96)  (1.96)**
Middle  group  (8 countries)  0.506  -0.13  1.21
(1.04)  (0.29)  (2.59)***
High group  (7 countries)  0.480  0.45  0.26
(1.16)  (0.98)  (0.34)
R2  0.82  0.84
Adjusted  R 2 0.77  0.79
F-test  16.9  17.9
Notes:  t-statistics  are in parentheses.
: Significant  at 10  percent  on  a  one-tail  test
*:  Significant  at  5 percent  on  a  one-tail  test
*¢:  Significant  at I percent  on  a one-tail  test
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